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ARBITRATION OF INVESTORS’ CLAIMS 
AGAINST ISSUERS: 
AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME? 
BARBARA BLACK* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Arbitration of investors’ claims against issuers is “an idea whose time has 
come” for over twenty years, ever since the U.S. Supreme Court, in 
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon1 and Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/American Express, Inc.,2 overturned long-standing precedent and held 
that arbitration provisions contained in brokerage customers’ agreements were 
enforceable with respect to federal securities claims. After these decisions, as 
arbitration before the self-regulatory organization (SRO) forums became the 
customary method of resolving disputes between individual investors and 
brokerage firms, some academics and practitioners suggested the use of 
mandatory arbitration to resolve investors’ claims against publicly traded 
issuers. Proposals were floated to include in an issuer’s governance documents a 
provision that would require arbitration of investors’ claims against the issuer.3 
A second round of proposals was advanced in the post-PSLRA (Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995) deregulatory climate.4 All proponents 
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 1.  482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
 2.  490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 3.  See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 
and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919, 953–70 (1988); Carl W. Schneider, 
Arbitration in Corporate Governance Documents: An Idea the SEC Refuses to Accelerate, INSIGHTS: 
CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR, May 1990, at 21; G. Richard Shell, Arbitration and Corporate Governance, 
67 N.C. L. REV. 517 (1989). 
 4.  See, e.g., COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE 
ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 109–12 (2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/ 
pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf; Cyril Moscow, Arbitration Bylaws to Bar Shareholder 
Class Actions, INSIGHTS: CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR, Apr. 2006, at 8; MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & 
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES 
LEADERSHIP 102–03, (2007), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ ny_report_final.pdf; Joseph 
W. Bartlett, Tort Reform in the Securities Sector, J. PRIVATE EQUITY, Winter 2008, at 99, 101–12; U.S. 
CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: THE PROBLEM, ITS 
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emphasized the traditional benefits of arbitration, namely, a faster, less 
expensive, and more flexible process in which arbitrators possessing expertise in 
the subject matter resolve the parties’ dispute. Many also advocated for 
arbitration as an antidote to perceived abuses of federal securities class actions.5 
To date, however, publicly traded domestic issuers and their counsel have 
not seriously pursued these proposals, probably because of several legal 
obstacles to implementation. First, there is doubt about the legality and 
enforceability under state corporate law of an arbitration provision contained in 
an issuer’s governance documents.6 Second, there is also doubt whether an 
issuer’s governance documents are commercial contracts within the meaning of 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) § 2.7 Third, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has never repudiated its staff position that an arbitration 
provision in a publicly traded issuer’s governance documents would violate the 
anti-waiver provisions of the Securities Act of 19338 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.9 
Recently, however, these legal obstacles may be eroding. First, while there 
continues to be uncertainty about the legality and enforceability of arbitration 
provisions contained in corporate governance documents, a recent Delaware 
Chancery Court opinion suggests that certificates of incorporation of publicly 
traded Delaware corporations could include arbitration clauses that would bind 
shareholders at least with respect to state fiduciary duty claims.10 Second, it is 
possible that even if Delaware courts held such arbitration provisions 
unenforceable, other courts could conclude that they were enforceable under 
the FAA, which would preempt the state law.11 Third, the SEC may find it 
difficult to maintain its opposition to arbitration provisions in governance 
documents in light of the fact that a number of foreign private issuers whose 
securities are traded in the United States have such provisions in their 
governance documents.12 
Apart from these legal obstacles, publicly traded issuers may not have 
previously perceived significant advantages to arbitration. Indeed, with respect 
to high-stakes “bet-the-company” disputes, such as securities class actions, 
 
IMPACT, AND THE PATH TO REFORM 42 (July 2008), available at http:// 
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/get_ilr_doc.php?docId=1213; Bradley J. Bondi, Facilitating Economic 
Recovery and Sustainable Growth Through Reform of the Securities Class-Action System: Exploring 
Arbitration as an Alternative to Litigation, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 607 (2010); Steven A. Ramirez, 
Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation: Dealing with the Meritorious as Well as the 
Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055 (1999). 
 5.  All those in note 4 except Professor Ramirez, who advocated arbitration because of the 
obstacles created by the PSLRA. 
 6.  See infra Part II.A.  
 7.  See infra Part II.B.  
 8.  15 U.S.C. § 77n (2006). 
 9.  Id. § 78cc. See infra Part II.C. 
 10.  See infra notes 31–40 and accompanying text.  
 11.  See infra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
 12.  See infra notes 72–80 and accompanying text. 
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litigation may be preferable.13 First, the very narrow grounds for judicial review 
of arbitration awards may make the risk of an aberrational award unacceptably 
high.14 Second, specifically with respect to federal securities claims, because the 
PSLRA imposes significant obstacles on plaintiffs, it was hard to see how 
relocating securities class actions from a court to a more flexible, less law-
oriented arbitration forum would provide any advantages to corporate 
defendants. Finally, issuers could expect that adoption of an arbitration 
provision would expose them to criticism from investor advocates and negative 
publicity.15 Taking into account all these factors, an issuer and its counsel were, 
at least until recently, likely to conclude that the costs of attempting to adopt an 
arbitration provision outweighed any likely benefits. Accordingly, few publicly 
traded domestic issuers took the bold step of adopting arbitration provisions in 
their governance documents. 
The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion,16 however, makes inclusion of an arbitration provision in a publicly 
traded issuer’s governance documents a proposal worthy of serious 
consideration. In that opinion, a majority of the Justices upheld a provision in a 
consumer contract that disallowed class arbitration because the FAA 
preempted California precedent striking down class arbitration waivers as 
unconscionable.17 In light of Concepcion, issuers may be able to achieve an 
advantage through the adoption of an arbitration provision in their governance 
documents that they were not able to achieve through the PSLRA and the 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act.18 They could finally achieve the 
demise of securities class claims! 
 
 13.  See infra Part III. 
 14.  9 U.S.C. § 10(a) sets forth narrow grounds for vacating awards based on arbitrator misconduct. 
It is not clear whether the judicially created ground of “manifest disregard of the law” survives Hall 
Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
 15.  McMahon was generally viewed as an anti-investor decision, and investors’ advocates urged 
Congress to enact legislation to overturn the result. See, e.g., McMahon Decision Should be Overturned 
to Protect Investors, House Panel Told, SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA), Apr. 1, 1988, available at Westlaw, 
20 SRLR 492. That negative perception continues, as the press frequently expresses negative views on 
customer arbitration. See Jill Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical 
Study of Investors’ Views of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2 J. DISP. RESOL. 349, 397 (2008). 
 16.  131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 17.  See infra Part IV.  
 18.  The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), Pub L. No. 105-353, 112 
Stat. 3227, amends Securities Exchange Act § 28(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb, to confer on federal courts 
exclusive jurisdiction over most securities class actions, because of the congressional concern that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys could avoid the PSLRA obstacles by bringing class actions in state courts. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006). 
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II 
LEGAL OBSTACLES ARE ERODING 
A. Legality and Enforceability Under State Corporate Law 
There is considerable uncertainty under state corporate law19 about the 
legality and enforceability of arbitration provisions contained in a publicly 
traded issuer’s governance documents.20 While modern corporation statutes 
allow great flexibility and private ordering, the discretion of corporate 
managers and shareholders to limit shareholders’ powers cannot “achieve a 
result forbidden by settled rules of public policy.”21 For that reason it is unlikely 
that, absent legislative authorization, corporations could amend their 
certificates of incorporation to eliminate directors’ fiduciary obligations.22 As 
another example, a 1926 Delaware Supreme Court opinion struck down a 
charter provision that gave a board of directors the power to deny a stockholder 
the right to inspect books and records.23 Unfortunately, there is very little recent 
case law addressing when this amorphous “public policy” standard has been 
violated. 
Further, even if an arbitration provision adopted by all shareholders was 
deemed legal under state law, there is a serious question of fairness about 
taking away rights from current shareholders who did not assent to the 
provision. While it is true that modern corporate law, with its emphasis on 
flexibility and adaptability, allows substantial alteration—even elimination—of 
shareholders’ rights without their consent, the power of shareholders holding a 
majority of the vote to alter corporate governance and stock ownership rules is 
not absolute. Thus, for example, majority shareholders cannot adopt an 
amendment to eliminate the board of directors, because that would deprive 
minority shareholders of the protections afforded by a board of directors with 
fiduciary responsibilities to the corporation.24 Similarly, although restrictions on 
transferability can be found in corporate governance documents, they are not 
 
 19.  I previously reviewed the legal arguments in Barbara Black, Eliminating Securities Fraud Class 
Actions Under the Radar, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 802, 838–42 (2009). 
 20.  Arbitration of shareholders’ disputes in closely held corporations has long been generally 
accepted, but in those instances the arbitration clause is typically found in a shareholders’ agreement. 
See id. at 843. 
 21.  Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 118 (Del. 1952). 
 22.  There is a contrary position. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of 
Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 28–30, 67–68 (1990) 
(discussing fiduciary duties as “simply one of many drafting alternatives,” a default that can be altered 
or abandoned in the corporate contract without statutory permission). For a more general advocacy of 
the contractual nature of corporations, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate 
Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989). 
 23.  State ex rel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 143 A. 257, 259–60 (Del. 1926). 
 24.  In Delaware a statutorily defined “close corporation” may provide for management by the 
shareholders if all the incorporators or shareholders agree to it and existence of the provision is 
conspicuously noted on the stock certificate. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351 (2011). See also MODEL 
BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32 (1984) (featuring a similar provision under which the agreement ceases to be 
effective when the corporation becomes public). 
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binding on current shareholders who do not assent to the restrictions.25 
Providing appraisal rights to shareholders if they dissent from the adoption of 
an arbitration provision may help to alleviate fairness concerns. 
Finally, assuming that an arbitration provision does not violate public policy 
and current shareholders who dissent from the provision are treated fairly, 
there is the question whether the provision is enforceable as to subsequent 
stockowners. Courts routinely state that charter provisions are binding on all 
shareholders, including subsequent purchasers, in the context of customary 
corporate governance provisions26 and provisions relating to the terms of the 
shares.27 But again, this principle is not without limits. Some changes so 
fundamentally alter the corporate governance structure or the shareholders’ 
property rights that they are limited to closely held corporations or require 
special protections for subsequent shareholders.28 Arbitration proponents assert 
that notice on the corporation’s web site and in its SEC filings would be 
sufficient to bind future owners,29 and because plaintiffs in securities fraud 
actions will likely rely on the fraud-on-the-market (FOTM) presumption,30 it 
would be inconsistent for them to argue that a public notice cannot bind them. 
Nevertheless, the issue remains unsettled. 
The foregoing summary is not intended to answer definitively whether 
arbitration provisions in governance documents of publicly traded issuers are 
legal and enforceable under state corporate law. Rather, I suggest that because 
of the considerable uncertainty as to these issues, publicly traded issuers and 
their counsel have been hesitant to put forward an arbitration provision for 
shareholder vote. 
A recent Delaware Chancery Court opinion, In re Revlon Inc. Shareholders 
Litigation,31 however, changes the equation and suggests that certificates of 
incorporation of publicly traded Delaware corporations could include an 
arbitration clause that would bind shareholders at least with respect to state 
 
 25.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(b) (2011).  
 26.  See, e.g., Goldboss v. Reimann, 55 F. Supp. 811, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Mason v. Mallard Tel. 
Co., 240 N.W. 671, 674 (Iowa 1932). 
 27.  See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Ford Holdings, Inc. Preferred Stock, 698 A.2d 973, 977 (Del. Ch. 
1997) (stating that terms of preferred shares can limit holders’ right to seek judicial appraisal).  
 28.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351 (eliminating the board of directors is available only to statutorily 
defined close corporations, all shareholders must approve the amendment, and there must be 
conspicuous notice of the provision on the stock certificate); id. § 151 (restrictions on the transferability 
of shares are binding on subsequent shareholders if there is conspicuous notice on the stock certificate 
or, in the case of uncertificated shares, it is contained in the required notice).  
 29.  See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 4, at 105. 
 30.  In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 225 (1988), the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the fraud-on-
the-market presumption of reliance, which is based on the theory that the price of securities traded in 
an efficient market should reflect all publicly available information. As a result, plaintiffs do not have 
to establish individual reliance on fraudulent statements. 
 31.  990 A.2d 940 (Del. Ch. 2010); see also Douzinas v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, Inc., 888 A.2d 
1146, 1149 (Del. Ch. 2006) (dictum suggesting that a provision in a certificate of incorporation could 
require arbitration of derivative claims). 
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fiduciary duty claims.32 In Revlon, Vice Chancellor Laster granted a motion to 
replace the original lead counsel because of counsel’s failure to advocate on 
behalf of the class and lack of candor with the tribunal.33 Acknowledging that 
greater oversight by the Delaware Chancery could lead to plaintiffs’ counsel 
filing in other jurisdictions, the Vice Chancellor stated: “If they do, and if 
boards of directors and shareholders believe that a particular forum would 
provide an efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then 
corporations are free to respond with charter provisions selecting an exclusive 
forum for intra-entity disputes.”34 Nevertheless, Vice Chancellor Laster 
indicated limits on this power: “I can envision that the Delaware courts would 
retain some measure of inherent residual authority so that entities created 
under the authority of Delaware law could not wholly exempt themselves from 
Delaware oversight. The issues implicated by an exclusive forum selection 
provision must await resolution in an appropriate case.”35 
After Revlon, a few Delaware corporations have amended their governance 
documents to provide that Delaware is the exclusive forum for intra-corporate 
litigation.36 Although a California federal district court held that a bylaw 
adopted by the Oracle board of directors specifying Delaware as the exclusive 
forum was not enforceable at least with respect to those who were shareholders 
prior to its adoption, the court acknowledged that, “were a majority of 
shareholders to approve such a charter amendment, the arguments for treating 
the venue provision like those in commercial contracts would be much stronger, 
even in the case of a plaintiff shareholder who had personally voted against the 
amendment.”37 
The U.S. Supreme Court has described predispute arbitration agreements as 
a form of forum selection clause.38 Accordingly, Revlon may provide 
encouragement to a publicly traded corporation that wishes to adopt an 
arbitration provision in its governance documents. The Delaware judiciary’s 
reaction to an arbitration provision that would largely remove fiduciary 
obligation litigation from judicial oversight, however, may well be different 
from its reaction to a clause specifying Delaware as the sole forum for fiduciary 
 
 32.  Revlon, 990 A.2d at 960–61. 
 33. Revlon is an instance of greater judicial scrutiny of those plaintiffs’ attorneys whom the 
Delaware judiciary has dubbed “frequent filers.” 
 34.  Id. at 959.  
 35.  Id. at 960 n.8. 
 36.  See Joseph A. Grundfest, Choice of Forum Provisions in Intra-Corporate Litigation: 
Mandatory and Elective Approaches (The 2010 Pileggi Lecture) (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance 
at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 91, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1690561 (finding that forum selection clauses in the governance documents of 
publicly traded corporations are “exceedingly rare,” although there has been a sharp increase since the 
Revlon decision).  
 37.  Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1175 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 38.  See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 255 n.11 (1987); see also 14 
Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009) (requiring arbitration of ADEA claims is not a waiver of 
the statutory claims). 
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obligation litigation. Mandatory arbitration tests the extent to which Delaware 
corporations can “exempt themselves from Delaware oversight”39 and may be a 
“bridge too far” for the judiciary.40 If that should prove to be the case, then the 
courts, and ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court, would have to address whether 
the arbitration provision was contained in a “contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce” under FAA § 2,41 so that the Delaware judiciary’s refusal 
to enforce it would be impermissible anti-arbitration animus.42 We turn next to 
this question. 
B. What Constitutes a Commercial Contract Under FAA § 2 
The FAA’s primary purpose is “ensuring that private arbitration 
agreements are enforced according to their terms”;43 to that end, the FAA 
preempts state law that exhibits anti-arbitration bias.44 If a publicly traded 
issuer’s governance documents constitute a “contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce” under FAA § 2, then courts must enforce an arbitration 
provision in those documents notwithstanding contrary state law. The 
prerequisite for invoking this federal pro-arbitration policy, however, is an 
agreement to arbitrate45 because “arbitration is strictly a matter of consent.”46 In 
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, the Court stated that courts should 
apply state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts in deciding 
whether parties agreed to arbitrate.47 
It is black letter law that the formation of a contract requires manifestation 
of mutual assent.48 There has been considerable litigation over assent to 
 
 39.  Revlon, 990 A.2d at 960 n.8. 
 40.  However, Delaware permits Chancellors to serve as arbitrators. See Delaware Court of 
Chancery Implements New Arbitration Procedures for Rapid Resolution of Business Disputes, Including 
Patent Disputes, FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.fr.com/Delaware-Court-of-
Chancery-Implements-New-Arbitration-Procedures-for-Rapid-Resolution-of-Business-Disputes-
Including-Patent-Disputes-02-18-2010/. (Thanks to John Coyle for alerting me to this.) 
 41.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 42.  See Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 685 (1996) (“[T]he proper inquiry here should 
focus . . . on this question: Would the application of [state law] undermine the goals and policies of the 
FAA.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 43.  Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989). 
 44.  See Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 681; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 
1753 (2011). 
 45.  Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2858–60 (2011); First Options of 
Chi. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).  
 46.  Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2857 n.6 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 47. 514 U.S. at 994 (1995). But cf. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964) 
(holding that federal labor law controlled because “a collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary 
contract”). 
 48.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 3 (agreement defined), 18 (manifestation of 
mutual assent) (1979); see also Rodgers v. Erickson Air-Crane Co. LLC, No. C.A. 98C-07-014 WTQ, 
2000 WL 1211157, at *6 (July 30, 1999) (“[M]utual assent is essential to the formation of . . . contracts”) 
(quoting 11 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 4:1 (4th ed. 1990)); Lopez v. Charles 
Schwab & Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 544, 548 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (“An essential element of any contract is 
the consent of the parties, or mutual assent.”) (quoting Donovan v. RRL Corp., 27 P.3d 702, 709 (Cal. 
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arbitration in cases where a document containing a purported agreement to 
arbitrate is made available (either physically or online) to an individual who 
then takes some action consistent with contract performance,49 such as keeping 
the purchased goods,50 continuing employment,51 or downloading software.52 
While the opinions reach different answers that may depend on specific factual 
issues,53 important factors are whether the individual received actual notice of 
the existence of the terms in sufficient time to renounce the transaction, and 
whether he took action that could constitute acceptance.54 It is not clear whether 
notice in a corporation’s SEC filings and on its corporate web site would be 
sufficient notice, and whether continuing to hold securities would be sufficient 
action, to manifest assent.55 It is possible for publicly traded issuers to deliver to 
shareholders a copy of the governance document containing an arbitration 
provision by including it, for example, in the annual proxy statement, and it can 
be argued that shareholders who continued to hold their shares after receiving 
the notice would be bound. The countervailing argument, that merely 
continuing to hold shares is not the manifestation of assent required under 
contract law, is also supportable.56 
State corporate law frequently refers to a corporation’s governance 
documents as a contract with the state57 and with the shareholders.58 An issue 
rarely addressed in the case law is whether this judicial notion of a contract in 
the context of resolving corporate governance issues should be deemed the 
equivalent of a commercial contract under FAA § 2. Arbitration of 
shareholders’ disputes in closely held corporations has long been generally 
 
2001)). 
 49.  See STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 2.22(b) (2d ed. 2007) 
(describing recurrent fact patterns and citing cases).  
 50.  E.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 51.  E.g., Hardin v. First Cash Fin. Servs., Inc., 465 F.3d 470 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 52.  E.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns. Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 53.  The sufficiency of notice also depends on the extent to which the document resembles a 
traditional contract. See, e.g., Metters v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 210, 214 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2008) (finding no agreement to arbitrate because the form did not look like a contract). 
 54.  Specht, 306 F.3d at 29. Compare Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 367 
(E.D.N.Y. 2009) (determining that the plaintiff’s use of the website was not assent because of the 
insufficient notice of terms), with Major v. McCallister, 302 S.W.3d 227, 231 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) 
(concluding that the plaintiff’s use of the website was assent because of the visibility of terms). 
 55.  Support for the argument that notice on the corporation’s website is sufficient can be found in 
the auction cases where, because of the special nature of auctions, the law imposes a greater 
responsibility on bidders to ascertain the terms of the sale. See Hessel v. Christie’s Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 
506, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). I discuss these cases in Black, supra note 19, at 849–50.  
 56.  See Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., No. 3:10-CV-957 JCH, 2011 WL 797505, at *6 (D. Conn. Feb. 
24, 2011) (holding that subscriber’s failure to cancel after viewing an email did not manifest assent to its 
arbitration provision); Bratek v. L&L Fin. Holdings, No. 10-246 (MLC), 2010 WL 1930598, at *5 
(D.N.J. May 12, 2010) (holding that arbitration provision on a warrant was not enforceable because 
investor never manifested assent to be bound). 
 57.  The metaphor goes back at least to Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 
(1819). 
 58.  See, e.g., STAAR Surgical Co. v. Waggoner, 588 A.2d 1130, 1136 (Del. 1991). 
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accepted,59 but the arbitration clause is typically found in an actual agreement 
entered into by all the shareholders.60 A recent Third Circuit opinion, applying 
Pennsylvania law, refused to enforce an arbitration provision contained in the 
bylaws of a professional corporation (a law firm) against a lawyer–shareholder 
in the absence of evidence that she assented to it.61 The plaintiff specifically 
averred that she was never provided a copy of the bylaws, was never informed 
of the existence of the arbitration provision in the bylaws, and never signed any 
document that referred to the arbitration provision. To counter this, the law 
firm argued that as a director, she had constructive notice of the terms of the 
bylaws. After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to address the “tension 
between corporate law principles and arbitration contract principles,”62 the 
Third Circuit determined that because the plaintiff did not receive a copy of the 
bylaws containing the arbitration provision, she could not have agreed to 
arbitrate. Note that the Third Circuit stated that there cannot be assent to 
arbitration without receipt of the arbitration agreement; it did not state that 
receipt of the arbitration provision, without more, would constitute the 
requisite manifestation of assent.63 If an affirmative act of acceptance is 
required, a shareholders’ vote on the management proxy card would possibly 
suffice, although there remains the issue of whether non-assenting shareholders 
would be bound.64 
The uncertainty under both state corporate and contract law could lead to 
different outcomes in different jurisdictions, possibly culminating in a 
showdown between the current Supreme Court, which is generally considered 
“pro-business,” and the Delaware judiciary, which is widely praised for its 
business acumen. Moreover, even if the arbitration provision is determined to 
be legal and enforceable under corporate or contract law, the legal battle may 
not be over for a publicly traded issuer wishing to adopt such a provision. 
Federal courts may determine that the arbitration provision is invalid with 
respect to federal securities claims because it violates the anti-waiver provisions 
of the federal securities laws. We turn next to this issue. 
 
 59.  See, e.g., Data Mountain Solutions, Inc. v. Giordano, 680 F. Supp. 2d 110 (D.D.C. 2010); see 
generally Shell, supra note 3, at 528–33. 
 60.  In addition, it may be included in the governance documents. See Shell, supra note 3 at 528, 
n.80.  
 61.  Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2009). Perhaps she would 
have been better off in arbitration, because the court subsequently granted the firm’s motion for 
summary judgment. Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., No. 06cv1495, 2009 WL 3602008 
(W.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2009).  
 62.  Kirleis, 560 F.3d at 158. 
 63.  See Bratek v. L&L Fin. Holdings, No. 10-246 (MLC), 2010 WL 1930598, at *5 (D.N.J. May 12, 
2010) (holding that an arbitration provision on a warrant was not enforceable because investor never 
manifested assent to be bound). 
 64.  The court in Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2011), discussed supra note 37 
and accompanying text, also recognized the tension between corporate and contract law principles 
when it found no mutual assent, at least with respect to preexisting shareholders, when a forum 
selection bylaw was adopted by directors, but stated that the argument for treating it like a commercial 
contract would be stronger if it had been adopted by a majority vote of the shareholders. 
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C. SEC Staff’s Position on Arbitration Provisions in Governance Documents 
Securities Act § 1465 and Securities Exchange Act § 29(a)66 (the anti-waiver 
provisions) invalidate “any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any 
person to waive compliance with” the federal securities statutes and their 
rules.67 In 1990, when a corporation that was planning its initial public offering 
(IPO) sought to include an arbitration provision in its governance documents, 
the SEC staff objected to its inclusion.68 In its view, 
it would be contrary to the public interest to require investors who want to participate 
in the nation’s equity markets to waive access to a judicial forum for vindication of 
federal or state law rights, where such a waiver is made through a corporate charter 
rather than through an individual investor’s decision.
69
 
Although there are differences between customer–broker and purchaser–
issuer claims that provide a basis for distinguishing McMahon–Rodriguez, it is 
not likely that those differences would persuade courts that the latter type of 
claims could not be brought in arbitration (assuming that the requisite 
agreement was present).70 Whatever the ultimate resolution of that legal issue, 
however, the SEC staff’s position presented a significant practical obstacle. An 
issuer that wanted to include an arbitration provision in its governance 
documents would have to work around the practical difficulties caused by the 
agency’s disapproval and suffer the consequences of incurring the SEC staff’s 
disapproval. 
There are signs that times have changed since 1990. Although the SEC has 
never publicly modified its staff position that arbitration clauses in corporate 
documents of publicly traded issuers are contrary to federal public policy, there 
were published reports in 2007 that the SEC, under the leadership of Chairman 
Christopher Cox, considered changing its policy.71 Moreover, some foreign 
private issuers whose securities trade in U.S. markets require arbitration of 
investors’ claims in their corporate governance documents72 or American 
 
 65.  15 U.S.C. § 77n (2006). 
 66.  15 U.S.C. § 78cc. 
 67.  For the legislative history and leading cases analyzing these provisions, see Black, supra note 
19, at 824–28. 
 68.  Both the attorney who represented the issuer and the attorney who was at the time Assistant 
General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, at the SEC wrote accounts of this incident, advocating 
for their respective positions. See Thomas L. Riesenberg, Arbitration and Corporate Governance: A 
Reply to Carl Schneider, INSIGHTS: CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR, Aug. 1990, at 2; Schneider, supra note 3. 
 69.  Riesenberg, supra note 68, at 2. 
 70.  The argument is essentially that purchaser–issuer claims involve more complex legal issues 
than a customer–broker dispute; yet the Supreme Court has approved of the arbitration of complex 
antitrust and RICO claims. See Black, supra note 19, at 828–32. I went on to argue that an arbitration 
provision with a class action waiver would violate the anti-waiver provisions. Id. at 832–35. I address 
this infra Part V.  
 71.  See Nicholas Rummel, SEC and Congress Gang up on Arbitration, FIN. WEEK, July 23, 2007, 
available at http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070723/REG/70720028/1002/; 
Kara Scannell, SEC Explores Opening Door to Arbitration, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2007, at A1. 
 72.  See, e.g., ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC, ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION (May 18, 2010), available at 
http://www.static.shell.com/static/investor/downloads/rds/corporate_governance/rds_articles_of_ 
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Depositary Receipt [or Share] (ADR) agreements.73 The best known is Royal 
Dutch Shell (RDS), incorporated under the laws of England and Wales, with its 
official residence in the Netherlands, whose ADRs are traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE). Its articles of association require that all shareholder 
disputes, including disputes arising under U.S. securities laws,74 be resolved in 
The Hague under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of 
Commerce.75 Indeed, a few securities and breach of fiduciary duty class claims 
involving publicly traded domestic and foreign private issuers have been filed in 
the American Arbitration Association (AAA) forum.76 In a matter that 
received considerable publicity, Harvard University, the owner of ADRs 
representing preferred shares of Surgut, a public oil and gas company organized 
under the laws of the Russian Federation, brought a purported class arbitration 
seeking money damages and declaratory relief for Surgut’s alleged failure to 
pay the full amount of mandated dividends.77 An AAA arbitration panel (by a 
two-to-one vote, the arbitrator appointed by Surgut dissenting) construed the 
arbitration clause to permit class arbitration, and a federal district court 
confirmed the award.78 After an appeal to the Second Circuit was stayed, 
Harvard and Surgut stipulated to the voluntary dismissal of the arbitration.79 
 
association_18052010.doc.; see also Christos Ravanides, Arbitration Clauses in Public Company 
Charters: An Expansion of the ADR Elysian Fields or a Descent into Hades?, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 
371, 389 (2007) (finding arbitration options or requirements in the charters, bylaws, or regional laws 
governing forty companies trading in the United States). 
 73.  See, e.g., JSC Surgutneftegaz v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 167 F. App’x 266, 267 
(2d Cir. 2006). 
 74.  Royal Dutch Shell plc, Annual Report (Form 20-F), at 85 (Mar. 9, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1306965/000095012311025398/u09838e20vf.htm. 
 75.  ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC, ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION §§ 138–40 (May 18, 2010), available 
at http://www.static.shell.com/static/investor/downloads/rds/corporate_governance/rds_articles_of_ 
association_18052010.doc.  
 76.  The pleadings and any awards issued are available in its public database, available at 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25562. A review of the AAA class arbitration database conducted in Fall 
2010 identified six cases involving investment disputes and another four involving business disputes. 
Most originated as judicial actions in which defendants were successful in requiring arbitration in the 
AAA forum on the basis of an arbitration clause contained in an agreement. In four cases in which 
defendants challenged class arbitration, arbitration panels construed arbitration clauses that were silent 
on the question of class arbitration as permitting class arbitration. (Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010), discussed infra notes 107–120 and accompanying text, will likely have 
an impact on this issue.) Derivative claims are not included in the AAA database; therefore, it could 
not be determined if any have been filed. A few courts have ordered the arbitration of derivative claims 
brought by public shareholders of securities brokerage firms, but it is not clear that any of these 
arbitrations took place. See, e.g., In re Salomon Inc. S’holders Derivative Litig., No. 91 Civ. 5500 (RPP), 
1994 WL 533595, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1994) (NYSE refused to accept claim); Frederick v. First 
Union Secs., Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 774, 779 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (NYSE refused to accept; court 
thought that NASD might accept). 
 77.  Demand for Class Arbitration, President and Fellows of Harvard Coll. v. JSC Surgutneftegaz, 
American Arbitration Association, AAA No. 11 168 T 01654 04, June 29, 2004, available at 
http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=3544. 
 78.  JSC Surgutneftegaz v. President and Fellows of Harvard Coll., No. 04 Civ. 6069(RMB), 2007 
WL 3019234, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2007). 
 79.  Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal and Order of Approval, President and Fellows of Harvard 
Coll. v. JSC Surgutneftegaz, American Arbitration Association, AAA No. 11 168 T 01654 04, available 
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Whatever the SEC’s current position on arbitration provisions in 
governance documents, if the agency permits securities of foreign private 
issuers that have arbitration provisions in their governance documents to trade 
in the U.S. markets, it will be hard-pressed to justify its continued opposition to 
the use of such provisions by U.S. issuers. If there was a trend in this direction, 
however, it appears to have stalled. A review of approximately seventy issuers 
with operations in China that conducted IPOs in 2010 found only one that 
explicitly stated that its articles of association required arbitration of disputes 
involving the articles of association or the applicable business company laws.80 
Of twenty-two foreign private issuers that conducted IPOs in 2011, as of 
October 28, 2011, none stated that it required arbitration. A number of issuers 
explicitly stated that their corporate governance documents did not require 
arbitration, which suggests that the SEC staff may have asked. 
As Part II makes clear, a publicly traded issuer contemplating inclusion of 
an arbitration provision in its governance documents would have to take into 
account the attendant legal uncertainties. These obstacles, however, are not 
necessarily insurmountable in the face of a determined campaign by a 
motivated issuer and its counsel. It is likely that publicly traded issuers have not 
seriously pursued any of the proposals that have been circulated over the past 
twenty years because they were not persuaded that there would be significant 
benefits to outweigh the considerable costs. Part III examines the arbitration 
and litigation options from the perspective of a corporate defendant to show 
why, at least until recently, litigation, and not arbitration, has been the 
preferred option. 
III 
COMPARING ARBITRATION AND LITIGATION: HIGH-STAKES CLAIMS 
From the perspective of a publicly traded issuer contemplating amendment 
of its governance documents to require arbitration of investors’ claims, the cost-
benefit analysis of arbitration versus litigation is complex.81 Adopting an 
arbitration provision would certainly entail significant initial costs. Because 
litigation is the default rule and arbitration in this context is not customary, 
transaction costs would be incurred in drafting the arbitration provision, 
amending the corporate governance documents, and in all likelihood litigating 
challenges to the provision, at least until the issues of legality and enforceability 
were resolved. Adopting an arbitration clause may also cost a corporate 
defendant in terms of reputation and bad publicity, given a strong belief among 
many investors and their advocates that arbitration is unfair and biased toward 
 
at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=5748. 
 80.  Data on file with author. 
 81.  See generally Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not 
Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 447–49 (2010) (reviewing factors 
outside the context of securities fraud and derivative claims). 
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businesses that are “repeat players.”82 The corporation may also experience a 
negative reaction from the SEC staff that could affect subsequent dealings with 
the agency. After the initial costs, arbitration entails some expenditures for the 
arbitration panel and forum that are not incurred in litigation.83 In the context 
of securities class actions and derivative claims, however, where other costs 
(principally lawyers’ and experts’ fees) are high, these costs may not be a 
significant factor in the equation.84 Nevertheless, arbitration would have to offer 
businesses meaningful advantages to warrant the additional costs of 
implementation. 
What are the potential advantages of arbitration? According to Professors 
Christopher Drahozal and Stephen Ware, parties will pay the additional costs 
associated with arbitration when they expect it will provide them with a better 
process or a better outcome.85 Potential benefits include (1) faster and less 
expensive proceedings, (2) decreased risk of aberrational jury verdicts, (3) more 
accurate outcomes because of arbitrator expertise or the application of trade 
rules, and (4) better protection of confidential information.86 Others stress the 
parties’ control over the process.87 Businesses often prefer arbitration in 
disputes that involve routine, small-stakes contracts,88 transnational contracts,89 
and situations where parties wish to maintain an ongoing relationship.90 
Conversely, Professors Drahozal and Ware identify certain categories of cases 
where parties prefer litigation over arbitration. The most important for our 
purpose is high-stakes “bet-the-company” litigation, where the limited grounds 
for judicial review of arbitration awards may make the risk of an aberrational 
award unacceptably high.91 
Commercial arbitration providers concur with the academic perspective. 
Organizations that have as their mission the promotion of dispute-resolution 
alternatives to litigation compile comparisons of arbitration and litigation.92 
 
 82.  See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1247, 1309–12 (2009) (discussing bias of arbitrators and arbitral forums towards defendants, particularly 
in the employment context); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. 
L. REV. 1631, 1650–51 (2005). 
 83.  Drahozal & Ware, supra note 81, at 447–49. 
 84.  CTR. FOR PUB. RES., ADR IN SECURITIES DISPUTES: MODEL ADR PROCEDURES 19 (1991). 
 85.  Drahozal & Ware, supra note 81, at 451. 
 86.  Id. at 451–52. 
 87.  DAVID B. LIPSKY & RONALD L. SEEBER, THE APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION OF CORPORATE 
DISPUTES 17 (1998). 
 88.  Such as securities broker–customer disputes. Black, supra note 19, at 828–36. 
 89.  “Arbitration is the dispute resolution mechanism of choice in international commerce.” 
Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of National Law: An Empirical Look at the New Law 
Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523, 523 (2005). Arbitration is seen as neutral forum, and awards 
are enforceable in foreign jurisdictions. Id. 
 90.  Drahozal & Ware, supra note 81, at 452. 
 91.  Id. at 454–56. 
 92.  E.g., INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOLUTION, ADR SUITABILITY GUIDE 
(FEATURING MEDIATION ANALYSIS SCREEN) (2003), available at http://www.cpradr.org/Portals/ 
0/Resources/ADR%20Tools/Tools/cpr%20suitability%20guide.pdf [hereinafter ADR Suitability 
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While they describe a number of advantages that arbitration has over 
litigation,93 they also describe the significant negative factor of arbitration in 
high-stakes litigation that should curb any corporate defendants’ enthusiasm for 
it, namely: “award is final & binding; limited grounds to vacate or modify 
award.”94 Securities class actions and derivative claims are paradigm cases of 
high-stakes disputes where corporate defendants fear an aberrational result 
imposing significant liability; hence meaningful judicial review is important.95 
In addition, corporate defendants will likely prefer litigation over arbitration 
because, specifically with respect to federal securities claims, the PSLRA 
imposes procedural obstacles on plaintiffs96 in order to achieve the statute’s twin 
goals of “curb[ing] frivolous, lawyer-driven litigation, while preserving 
investors’ ability to recover on meritorious claims.”97 Because arbitration is a 
more flexible, less law-oriented forum, arbitration panels may not apply these 
legal procedures rigorously. Accordingly, corporate defendants are not likely to 
find arbitration advantageous. 
But what if publicly traded issuers could eliminate at least some high-stakes 
dispute resolution? That would certainly change the cost-benefit analysis. We 
turn now to the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on class arbitration. 
IV 
CLASS ARBITRATION IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE GAME 
CHANGER—AT&T MOBILITY LLC V. CONCEPCION 
Since its 2005 opinion, Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,98 the Supreme 
Court has effected a complete reversal in its position on high-stakes arbitration, 
culminating in its 2011 opinion in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,99 the 
game changer that allows class action waivers in consumer arbitration. 
In Bazzle a divided Court considered whether an arbitration clause in 
consumer-lending contracts that was silent on the issue of class arbitration could 
be interpreted to permit it. Justice Breyer, in an opinion joined by three other 
Justices,100 stated that this was a state-law issue of contract interpretation that, 
 
Guide]. 
 93.  Advantages of arbitration that would be attractive to corporate defendants include the limited 
discovery production, the confidentiality of proceedings, and the parties’ ability to select arbitrators, 
often with special expertise. Id. at 30. 
 94.  Id. at 30, 32.  
 95.  See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners at 16–17, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) 
(No. 08-1198). 
 96.  See DONNA M. NAGY, RICHARD W. PAINTER & MARGARET V. SACHS, SECURITIES 
LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT 9–10 (2d ed. 2008). 
 97.  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). 
 98.  539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
 99.  131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 100.  Justice Stevens would have affirmed the judgment below, seeing no need to remand, but 
because that would have meant that there was no controlling judgment of the Court, he concurred in 
the judgment. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 454 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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under the FAA, is decided by the arbitrator. In contrast, the dissenting Justices 
interpreted the contract term giving the commercial lender the right to select an 
arbitrator for each dispute as precluding class arbitrations.101 
Courts102 and commentators103 interpreted Bazzle as authorizing arbitrators 
to permit class arbitrations so long as the arbitration agreement did not 
expressly prohibit it. In response to Bazzle, the AAA developed and 
implemented a set of rules to govern class arbitrations, which went into effect in 
October 2003.104 As of September 2009, the AAA had administered 283 class 
actions under its class rules.105 Although most were consumer- or employment-
related claims, there was a small number that involved corporate or securities 
matters or other complex business disputes.106 
Five years after Bazzle, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of the 
permissibility of class arbitration when the arbitration agreement is silent on the 
issue. In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,107 a majority of 
the Justices held that the arbitrators exceeded their power under the FAA 
because they construed an arbitration clause in a shipping charter to permit 
class arbitration as a matter of public policy.108 The parties stipulated that the 
arbitration clause was silent with respect to class arbitration and that “[a]ll the 
parties agree that when a contract is silent on an issue there’s been no 
agreement that has been reached on that issue.”109 In reaching its decision, the 
arbitration panel relied in part on the fact that other arbitrators had, post-
Bazzle, construed a variety of arbitration clauses to permit class arbitration, and 
that to rule otherwise “would leave ‘no basis for a class action absent express 
agreement among all parties and the putative class members.’”110 
In finding that the arbitration panel had exceeded its powers, Justice Alito, 
writing for the majority, made clear what he viewed as the essential hubris of 
the arbitration panel: 
Rather than inquiring whether the FAA, maritime law, or New York law contains a 
“default rule” under which an arbitration clause is construed as allowing class 
 
 101.  Id. at 451 (majority opinion). Justice Thomas wrote a one-paragraph dissent reiterating his 
consistent position that the FAA did not apply to proceedings in state courts. Id. at 460 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 102.  E.g., Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 992 (9th Cir. 2007); Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 100 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 139 S. Ct. 1758 (2010); 
Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 262 (Ill. 2006). 
 103.  See, e.g., Carole J. Buckner, Due Process in Class Arbitration, 58 FLA. L. REV. 185, 187 (2006); 
Hans Smit, Class Actions in Arbitration, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 175, 176 (2003). 
 104.  Brief of American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 3–
4, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (No. 08-1198). 
 105.  Id. at 22. 
 106.  See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 107.  130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
 108.  The three dissenting Justices (Ginsburg, Stevens, and Breyer) argued that the issue was not 
ripe for judicial review because this was a “partial award” that ruled only that the arbitration clause 
permitted class arbitration. Id. at 1779 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 109.  Id. at 1766 (majority opinion) (quotation marks omitted). 
 110.  Id. 
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arbitration in the absence of express consent, the panel proceeded as if it had the 
authority of a common-law court to develop what it viewed as the best rule to be 
applied in such a situation. Perceiving a post-Bazzle consensus among arbitrators that 
class arbitration is beneficial in “a wide variety of settings,” the panel considered only 
whether there was any good reason not to follow that consensus in this case. . . . The 
conclusion is inescapable that the panel simply imposed its own conception of sound 
policy.
111
 
The majority, moreover, did more than vacate the award; rather than 
remand to the arbitration panel, it went on to construe the arbitration clause as 
not permitting class arbitrations. Recognizing that this action appeared at 
variance with Bazzle, the majority took pains to narrow the import of that 
previous decision. Emphasizing repeatedly that the rationale of Justice Breyer’s 
opinion did not constitute the views of a majority of Justices,112 Justice Alito 
described Bazzle’s plurality opinion as addressing only one narrow question: 
that the arbitrators, and not the court, should decide whether a contract is 
“silent” on the question of class arbitration.113 It did not, according to Justice 
Alito, address the standard for determining whether an arbitration agreement 
allows class arbitration.114 In this discussion, Justice Alito raised the question 
whether the permissibility of class arbitrations is more than an issue of contract 
interpretation: “[D]oes the FAA entirely preclude class arbitration? Does the 
FAA permit class arbitration only under limited circumstances, such as when 
the contract expressly so provides? Or is this question left entirely to state 
law?”115 Leaving these questions unanswered, the majority held that “an implicit 
agreement to authorize class-action arbitration . . . is not a term that the 
arbitrator may infer solely from the fact of the parties’ agreement to 
arbitrate.”116 
In Stolt-Nielsen, the majority of the Court signaled that Bazzle should no 
longer be read to encourage class arbitrations.117 In addition, in arriving at its 
 
 111.  Id. at 1768–69. 
 112.  Essentially, then, Bazzle established no precedent! See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Stipanowich on 
Stolt: Outcome Over Clarity (April 28, 2010), http://www.cpradr.org/Resources/ALLCPRArticles/ 
tabid/265/ArticleType/ArticleView/ArticleID/587/Default.aspx (“It reminds me of the television show 
where a character woke up and discovered that the last couple of television seasons had all been a 
dream!”).  
 113.  Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1772 (“Unfortunately, the opinions in Bazzle appear to have baffled 
the parties in this case at the time of the arbitration proceeding. For one thing, the parties appear to 
have believed that the judgment in Bazzle requires an arbitrator, not a court, to decide whether a 
contract permits class arbitration. . . . In fact, however, only the plurality decided that question. But we 
need not revisit that question here because the parties’ supplemental agreement expressly assigned this 
issue to the arbitration panel, and no party argues that this assignment was impermissible.”).  
 114.  Id. (“Unfortunately, however, both the parties and the arbitration panel seem to have 
misunderstood Bazzle in another respect, namely, that it established the standard to be applied by a 
decision maker in determining whether a contract may permissibly be interpreted to allow class 
arbitration.”). 
 115.  Id. at 1771. 
 116.  Id. at 1775. 
 117.  See SI Strong, Opening More Doors Than It Closes, 2010 LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 565, 568 
(describing the opinion as signaling that the court may be cutting back its pro-arbitration precedent and 
as “extremely troubling”). 
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conclusion that parties must agree specifically to class arbitration, the Court’s 
majority opinion emphasized the fundamental differences between traditional 
arbitration and class arbitration. Thus, the majority reminded us, the typical 
arbitration is a relatively simple proceeding. Even when the subject matter of 
the dispute is complex, the task of the arbitrator is to resolve a single dispute 
that adjudicates the rights of a few identified parties who appear before the 
forum. In contrast, in a class arbitration, there is additional complexity because 
the arbitrator seeks to resolve many disputes that involve the adjudication of 
the rights of numerous parties, most of whom are absent from the proceeding. 
The Court made this point most explicitly when it compared and contrasted 
class arbitration and class-action litigation: “the commercial stakes of class-
action arbitration are comparable to those of class-action litigation, . . . even 
though the scope of judicial review is much more limited . . . .”118 In short, there 
should be certainty that parties have agreed to a method of dispute resolution 
that appears ill-suited to their needs.119 
In addition, the Court highlighted two concerns that call into question the 
appropriateness of a private contractual justice system: the need to protect the 
interests of absent parties, and the importance of providing meaningful review 
of an arbitration award that has significant consequences for the parties, 
including absent class members.120 
The Supreme Court returned to the differences between bilateral and class 
arbitration in Concepcion121 and held that the FAA preempted California law 
that disallowed class action waivers in consumer arbitration agreements. Under 
California’s Discover Bank rule, a waiver found in a consumer contract of 
adhesion, “in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties 
predictably involve small amounts of damages,” acts to exempt the responsible 
party from liability and is therefore unconscionable under California law.122 
Although the Discover Bank rule applied to the waivers of all class claims 
(judicial and arbitration), a majority of the Justices123 found that it was “an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives”:124 “The overarching 
purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements 
according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings. Requiring 
the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of 
 
 118.  Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776. 
 119.  The Stolt-Nielsen majority emphasized that the agreement at issue involved arms-length 
bargaining among sophisticated parties, at least leaving open the possibility of distinguishing situations 
like Concepcion that involve consumer class arbitrations. See id. at 1775. 
 120.  Id. at 1776. 
 121.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 122.  Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005). 
 123.  Justice Thomas reluctantly joined the majority and wrote a concurring opinion founded on 
statutory interpretation of the FAA §§ 2, 4. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753–56 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Id. at 
1756 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 124.  Id. at 1748 (majority opinion). 
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arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”125 
As did Justice Alito in Stolt-Nielsen, Justice Scalia enumerated the 
differences between bilateral and class arbitration to support his conclusion that 
“class arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by Discover Bank rather than 
consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA.”126 In class arbitration, the traditional 
advantages of arbitration—informality, low cost, and speed—are lost because of 
the need for procedures to deal with class certification issues and protection of 
absent class members.127 In particular, Justice Scalia emphasized the increased 
risks to defendants presented by class arbitration, where high stakes combined 
with minimal judicial review may work to pressure defendants into settling 
claims of questionable merit.128 For these reasons, “[w]e find it hard to believe 
that defendants would bet the company with no effective means of review, and 
even harder to believe that Congress would have intended to allow state courts 
to force such a decision.”129 
Although Concepcion considered class action waivers in the context of 
consumer arbitration contracts, the majority’s opinion does not suggest any 
inclination to limit its holding to that category of contract. Accordingly, 
Concepcion provides an incentive for publicly traded issuers that wish to 
eliminate securities class actions seriously to consider amending their 
governance documents to include an arbitration provision with a class action 
waiver. 
V 
LEGALITY OF CLASS ACTION WAIVERS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS 
Suppose a publicly traded domestic issuer adopts an arbitration provision 
with a class action waiver. A class action waiver with respect to securities class 
actions raises two additional possible challenges to its validity: (1) it may be 
unenforceable because it is unconscionable under the FAA; and (2) it may be 
unenforceable, with respect to federal securities class claims, because it violates 
the anti-waiver provisions of the federal securities laws.130 Before we examine 
the legal arguments, we need to consider the impact of a class action waiver on 
investors.131 
 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. at 1751. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at 1752. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text. State law may similarly restrict, on public policy 
grounds, limitations on liability. See, e.g., Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F&W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 
1032, 1036 (Del. Ch. 2006) (holding that public policy does not permit a contractual provision to limit 
the remedy in the case of intentional misrepresentations).  
 131.  An important issue is what the effect of an arbitration provision in the issuer’s governance 
documents would have on potential third-party defendants, such as accountants and underwriters. See 
Thompson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 776–80 (2d Cir. 1995) (setting forth various 
contract and agency theories for requiring non-signatories to arbitrate). 
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Institutional investors would likely not experience a serious diminishment of 
their remedies, since they would be able to bring individual securities actions in 
the arbitration forum so long as their losses were large enough to make it cost-
effective. Some institutional investors, in fact, have recently opted out of class 
actions to pursue their own remedies when they have a sufficient amount at 
stake.132 Requiring them to bring their actions in a commercial arbitration forum 
(such as AAA) is not likely to present any difficulties that experienced litigators 
could not adjust to; as noted above, there have been federal securities claims 
filed in the AAA forum.133 
For other investors, particularly small retail investors, however, it is a 
different story. Their claims will not be sufficiently large to make it 
economically feasible to bring individual arbitration claims. The costs of 
proving a federal securities fraud claim—including falsity, materiality, efficient 
market, scienter, causation, and damages134—are generally so large as to make 
pursuing individual claims infeasible for small retail investors. The only chance 
for compensation for their losses will be if the SEC, or another regulator, brings 
an enforcement action against the issuer, obtains a monetary recovery, and 
establishes a fund to compensate investors.135 In instances where a regulator 
does not pursue actions against issuers, small investors will not be compensated 
for their losses. Will the lack of an available remedy cause courts to strike down 
a class arbitration waiver under the FAA or federal securities laws? 
In its 2000 opinion, Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, the Supreme 
Court stated that “it may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs 
could preclude a litigant . . . from effectively vindicating her federal statutory 
rights in the arbitral forum.”136 The Second Circuit has been hostile toward class 
action waivers for this very reason. In its first opinion in In re American Express 
Merchants’ Litigation,137 the Second Circuit held that a class action waiver was 
unenforceable because it would effectively preclude individual plaintiffs from 
vindicating their statutory rights under federal antitrust law,138 because of the 
high litigation costs and the small potential recovery.139 The court agreed with 
 
 132.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class Actions: Why “Exit” 
Works Better than “Voice”, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 407, 426–29 (2008). 
 133.  See supra notes 73–79. In fact the plaintiffs in Harvard voluntarily brought this as an 
arbitration; they could have gone to federal district court. Demand for Class Arbitration, President and 
Fellows of Harvard Coll. v. JSC Surgutneftegaz, American Arbitration Association, AAA No. 11 168 T 
01654 04, June 29, 2004, at 13, available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=3544. 
 134.  See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005) (setting forth the elements of an 
action). 
 135.  For a description of the SEC’s authority to establish Fair Funds for investor compensation, see 
Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?, 63 BUS. LAW. 371 
(2008). 
 136.  531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000). 
 137.  554 F.3d 300, 312 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated sub nom, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 
S. Ct. 2401 (2010). For further discussion of this case, see Black, supra note 19, at 834–35. 
 138.  554 F.3d at 304. 
 139.  Id. at 317 (quotation marks removed).  
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the plaintiffs that the class action waiver “flatly ensures that no small merchant 
may challenge American Express’s tying arrangements,”140 a troubling outcome 
because “private suits provide a significant supplement to the limited resources 
available to the Department of Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws and 
deterring violations.”141 Defendants sought certiorari before the Supreme Court, 
which granted the petition, vacated the decision, and remanded for 
reconsideration in light of Stolt-Nielsen.142 
In its opinion on remand, which was decided prior to Concepcion, the 
Second Circuit affirmed its earlier decision,143 essentially finding that Stolt-
Nielsen was not relevant: 
While Stolt-Nielsen plainly rejects using public policy as a means for divining the 
parties’ intent, nothing in Stolt-Nielsen bars a court from using public policy to find 
contractual language void. We agree with plaintiffs that “[t]o infer from Stolt-Nielsen‘s 
narrow ruling on contractual construction that the Supreme Court meant to imply that 
an arbitration is valid and enforceable where, as a demonstrated factual matter, it 
prevents the effective vindication of federal rights would be to presume that the Stolt-
Nielsen court meant to overrule or drastically limit its prior precedent.”
144
 
Some commentators hold out the hope that American Express Merchants 
can stand post-Concepcion.145 It is possible to distinguish Concepcion on legal 
grounds, because the Supreme Court’s majority ruled that the FAA preempts a 
state law invalidating class action waivers as unconscionable but did not address 
unconscionability as a question of substantive arbitration law. Moreover, 
Concepcion can be factually distinguished, because AT&T had, in fact, 
provided an attractive arbitration remedy for individual consumers so that they 
were not left without a remedy.146 Nevertheless, the tenor of the majority’s 
opinion in Concepcion does not suggest that those Justices would be amenable 
to narrowing its holding. 
The argument that a waiver of a securities class action violates the anti-
 
 140.  Id. at 319 (quotation marks removed). 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Am. Express Co., 130 S. Ct. 2401. 
 143.  In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 200 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 144.  Id. at 199 (quoting plaintiffs’ brief); see also Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 
6950 (LBS) (JCF), 2011 WL 1795297, at *12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2011) (denying employer’s motion 
to compel arbitration because a former employee’s discrimination claims could not be vindicated in 
individual arbitration). 
 145.  The Second Circuit reaffirmed its analysis post-Concepcion. In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 
No. 06-1871-cv, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 1871 (2d Cir. Feb. 1, 2012). See also S.I. Strong, Does Class 
Arbitration ‘Change the Nature’ of Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T, and a Return to First Principles, 
17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 28, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1791928 ) (arguing that Concepcion “deals only 
with state-law preemption issues and leaves courts free to strike class action waivers on other 
grounds”).  
 146.  Any arbitration would be conducted in the county where the customer was billed, and, for 
small claims, customers could choose to conduct arbitration personally, telephonically, or just through 
submissions. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011). AT&T would pay all 
costs for non-frivolous claims, could not seek reimbursement of its attorney fees, and was subject to 
punitive damages. Id. If an arbitration award was granted greater than AT&T’s last written settlement 
offer, AT&T was required to pay a minimum recovery of $7500 plus double attorney’s fees. Id. 
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waiver provisions of the federal securities laws because of the loss of the 
individual investors’ private remedy is stronger. As the McMahon majority 
stated, Exchange Act § 29(a) is concerned with whether the agreement 
“‘weakens [customers’] ability to recover under the Exchange Act.’”147 It is well-
established that § 29(a) does not permit provisions that weaken investors’ 
ability to recover under the federal securities laws, no matter what form they 
take.148 The high costs of pursuing federal securities claims means that, unless a 
class-wide remedy is available, there is, as a practical matter, no remedy for 
investors with small holdings. A class action waiver in this context is the 
equivalent of a waiver of investor protections prohibited by the anti-waiver 
provisions. 
To counter this argument, opponents of the federal securities class action 
assert that class actions serve poorly the compensatory function, and, therefore, 
the individual investors would not lose anything of significance by waiving their 
rights to participate in a class.149 Moreover, in Stoneridge Investment Partners 
LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,150 the Court suggested that it agreed with 
business interests that the power of regulators to recover funds for the 
compensation of fraud victims provided an adequate opportunity for 
compensation. To the extent that courts doubt the compensatory function of 
class actions, the policy argument based on the anti-waiver provisions is less 
compelling. 
There are implications beyond investor compensation if issuers prove 
successful in replacing securities class actions with individual arbitrations. It is 
worth remembering that there is a fundamental difference between arbitration 
and litigation. Arbitration is a contractual private system of justice, where the 
arbitrators are selected by the parties for the sole purpose of deciding the 
dispute before them. Their charge is to meet their contractual responsibilities to 
the parties.151 Litigation, in contrast, takes place in a government forum, before 
government officials with a responsibility to look out for the public interest. 
Adjudications, unlike arbitrations, fulfill the functions of developing legal 
standards, deterring violations, and satisfying investors’ right to know the laws 
 
 147.  Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 230 (1987) (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 
346 U.S. 427, 432 (1953)). 
 148.  See, e.g., Vacold LLC v. Cerami, 545 F.3d 114, 122 (2d Cir. 2008) (release in stock purchase 
agreement); AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174, 183 (3d Cir. 2003) (non-reliance clause in 
stock purchase agreement); McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entm’t, Inc., 65 F.3d 1044, 1051 (2d Cir. 
1995) (no-action clause in indenture); Anglo-German Progressive Fund, Ltd. v. Concorde Grp., Inc., 
No. 09 Civ. 8708(PKC), 2010 WL 3911490, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2010) (merger clause); Citibank v. 
Itochu Int’l, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 6007(GBD), 2003 WL 1797847, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2003) (clause 
specifying indemnification as sole remedy); Special Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Balto, 325 F. Supp. 1185 (D. 
Minn. 1971) (clause providing for alternative remedy). 
 149.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay in Deterrence and its 
Implications, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1545 (stating that, “from a compensatory perspective, the 
conclusion seems inescapable that the securities class action performs poorly”). 
 150.  552 U.S. 148, 166 (2008). 
 151.  Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1774–75 (2010). 
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are being enforced. Ironically, the best argument for the importance of the 
federal securities class action is the PSLRA, legislation that came about largely 
through the lobbying efforts of the business community. Business interests 
urged Congress to eliminate the FOTM presumption, without which securities 
fraud class actions would be difficult, if not impossible, to maintain.152 Instead, 
the PSLRA sought to weed out frivolous suits through a variety of procedural 
and other measures.153 In choosing to cure, but not eliminate, the securities class 
action, Congress determined that a class action remedy is necessary for investor 
protection, especially retail investors. In the PSLRA Congress thus confirmed 
the importance of the federal securities class action to the integrity of the U.S. 
capital markets.154 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
As this article has explained, post-Concepcion, publicly traded domestic 
issuers have good reason to consider seriously the adoption of arbitration 
provisions, with class action waivers, in their governance documents. Although 
there is considerable uncertainty about the legality and enforceability of such a 
provision, an issuer may well consider the potential benefits worth fighting for. 
Although the enforceability of an arbitration provision in governance 
documents raises interesting and complex legal questions, the overarching 
policy issue is the future of the securities class action. Respected academics 
have previously called for the SEC to take an active role in assessing the 
strengths and weaknesses of the federal securities class action.155 There have 
been similar calls for reform of state securities class actions.156 Before issuers 
undertake to adopt changes to their corporate governance documents to 
eliminate securities class actions, a re-examination of their costs and benefits is 
in order. 
 
 152.  See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 664–67 (3d ed. 2003). 
 153.  For a brief description of the key provisions, see NAGY ET AL., supra note 96, at 9–10. 
 154.  See H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 26 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731. 
 155.  See, e.g., Letter from Professor Donald C. Langevoort et al. to SEC Chairman Christopher 
Cox (Aug. 2, 2007), available at http://www.law.du.edu/images/uploads/corporate-governance/sec-
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 156.  See, e.g., Mark Lebovitch, Jerry Silk & Jeremy Friedman, Making Order Out of Chaos: A 
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